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WHEN AND WHY LAWYERS ARE THE PROBLEM
David A. Hyman*

Whenever you got business trouble, the best thing to do is to get a
lawyer. Then you got more problems, but at least you got a lawyer.'
INTRODUCTION

There have always been bad lawyers-and even good lawyers can
give what turns out to be bad advice-at least when judged, as they
always are, in hindsight. 2 So what's new or, if not new, different about
the current state of affairs? The prospectus for the Clifford Symposium suggested that the problem is that, instead of the "classical arrangement, in which the private practitioner renders legal advice to
those who retain him or her for specific matters," there is now a "wide
variety of other approaches ...[that have] made the delivery of legal
services more responsive to client needs ...[but] have also exposed
both lawyers and clients to new pressures that may jeopardize the
'3
quality of the advice delivered."
There is no question that there have been profound changes in the
lawyer-client relationship over the past several decades, as competition has made the delivery of legal services more responsive to consumers' wants and needs. I am considerably more skeptical about the
claim that these changes have jeopardized the quality of legal advice.
What counts as "quality" legal advice depends greatly on one's prior
assumptions about the expected scope and nature of the representation-and those assumptions are contingent upon a host of factors,
including willingness to pay. It is one thing to complain ex post about
* Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Illinois. I appreciate the helpful comments of
Peter Jacobson, Sarah Mathias, Charles Silver, and Daniel Sokol.
1. WorkingHumor.com, Humorous Quotes Attributed to Chico Marx, http:/workinghumor.
com/quotes/chicomarx.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
2. I have addressed the issues raised in this Article in previous works, including David A.
Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle: Will Lawyers
or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 353 (1997) [hereinafter Hyman, Professional Responsibility]; and David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959
(1998). Much of the analysis in Parts II and III is drawn from those articles. See infra notes 8-31
and accompanying text.
3. The Thirteenth Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, Symposium
Packet, Introduction by Prof. Stephan Landsman (2007) (on file with the DePaul Law Review).
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conflicts of interest and inadequacies in the advice that has been provided-and there will always be experts in professional responsibility
available to opine how the professionally dictated standard would
have prevented the problem. It is quite another thing to establish that
consumers are willing ex ante to pay for the costs of those professionally dictated standards of care.
Stated differently, complaints about "new pressures that may jeopardize the quality of the advice delivered" are a long way from proving that the old way of doing things involved sensible default ruleslet alone efficient mandatory minimum rules. Yet it has historically
been a short step from complaints about "new pressures that may
jeopardize the quality of the advice delivered" to various forms of regulation designed to insulate the profession and professionals from
those pressures-with the costs of such protections borne by consumers. Both the legal and medical professions have been conspicuous
offenders in this regard-except that the legal profession has succeeded in insulating more of its actions from antitrust scrutiny.
Part II explores how the medical profession has dealt with these
issues. 4 Part III catalogs a few recent episodes involving the legal profession that show the same tendencies.5 Part IV turns to the more
subtle and less frequent issue: when lawyers qua lawyers are the prob7
lem. 6 Part V concludes.
II.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION:

YOU'RE NEVER ALONE

WHEN YOU'RE SCHIZOPHRENIC

Professional regulation is routinely analyzed on an ahistorical, profession-specific basis. This approach is deeply problematic; seeing
how common issues (the scope and degree of deference to professional authority, deciding whether ethics rules are defaults or
mandatory minimums, the extent of continuing education and monitoring of competence) have been handled over time and across professions helps demonstrate the contingent nature and mutability of the
boundaries that are set and the bargains that are made. A longer and
broader view also provides a welcome dose of humility for those considering the merits and demerits of both the old and new rules, because it shows the ad hoc (if not outright schizophrenic) nature of past
rules and the likely compromises that will be seen in future rules. This
broader perspective also makes it clear that one should view com4.
5.
6.
7.

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

notes
notes
notes
notes

8-23 and accompanying text.
24-31 and accompanying text.
32-49 and accompanying text.
50-52 and accompanying text.
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plaints by professionals about how competition will adversely affect
consumers with considerable skepticism, because self-interest has a
distinct tendency to skew such assessments. 8
I focus on the medical profession, because it is analogous to the
legal profession in a number of ways, including the degree of expertise
and prestige of those involved and the extent to which competition
has reshaped the terrain in recent years. For much of its history, the
medical profession operated as a classic cottage industry, and professional ethics focused on the "traditional rules prohibiting doctors indulgence in the three A's: adultery, alcoholism, and, worst of all,
advertising." 9 As this aphorism suggests, opposition to competition in
its myriad forms was a core principle of organized medicine:
[O]utbreaks of... competition were ruthlessly suppressed, with the
result that the hegemony of the dominant ideology was seldom challenged. Under the banners of "medical science," "quality of care,"
and "professional prerogative," the medical profession was able to
repel most attacks along its borders, to force many of its antagonists
into alliances, and to confine other would-be invaders to narrow
enclaves. 10
The basic position of the American Medical Association (AMA) on
health matters was that all involved had to accept "the private physician's monopoly control of the medical market and complete authority over all aspects of medical institutions."'" This fundamental
precept was manifested in various ways. For example, beginning in
1927, the AMA took the position that a contract to deliver medical2
services required a reasonable degree of free choice of physicians.'
The AMA repeatedly affirmed this position over the following fifty
years until it was determined to constitute a restraint of trade. 13 Al8. David B. Wilkins, Partner,Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1264, 1275 (2007):
Far too many trees have been killed in defense of an understanding of professionalism
that treats the well-being of lawyers as the primary good to be protected. And, as
Professor Richard Abel has so ably demonstrated, many if not most of the restrictions
that the profession has erected against the unauthorized practice of law in the name of
the public interest are far more protective of lawyers' income and status than they are
of the public.
Id.; see also Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Some people believe with
great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their self-interest.").
9. Stephen G. Potts, Looking for the Exit Door: Killing and Caring in Modern Medicine, 25
Hous. L. REV. 493, 493 (1988).
10. Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M.P. King, Private Credentialingof Health Care Personnel:
An Antitrust Perspective-PartTwo, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263, 291 (1983).
11. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 300 (1982).
12. In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd,
455 U.S. 676 (1982) (equally divided court).
13. See id.
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though the AMA's position appeared innocuous, it essentially prevented "a group of doctors from offering care to patients at any lower
price than their colleagues. In the name of free choice, it effectively
eliminated the possibility of competition and the right to patients to
choose among competing physician groups." 14 By effectively precluding selective contracting, the ethical rule crippled insurers in their negotiations with providers and helped maintain healthcare as a cottage
15
industry built on a foundation of fee-for-service reimbursement.
In like fashion, the AMA and its local societies adopted ethical
16
rules that prohibited salaried practice and prepaid medical care.
Physicians who entered into such arrangements and those who consulted with them were expelled-foreclosing access to local hospitals
and cross-coverage. After one of the most bitter battles in the history
of modern American medicine, the Supreme Court held that the
17
AMA and a local medical society had violated the Sherman Act.
Despite this success, opposition to alternative delivery models continues, albeit at a lower level of intensity.
Although organized medicine suffered defeats in these cases, the
larger framework of laws and practices reflected medical dominance
of institutional arrangements. 18 Health Maintenance Organizations
operated quite successfully in some parts of the country and developed their own institutional ethic, but the paradigmatic doctor practiced alone or in a small group. Prohibitions on corporate practice
remained on the books; compensation was based almost exclusively
on piecework; all microallocation decisions were made by physicians;
and tax-subsidized private insurance and public underwriting of care
for the elderly-Medicare-and the poor-Medicaid-encouraged
the near-complete insulation of patients from cost. Not surprisingly,
there were dramatic, system-wide financial consequences, because
every incentive pointed toward increased consumption-including the
medical profession's ethic of absolute fidelity to patients, which blossomed when watered by an artesian well of money.
14. STARR, supra note 11, at 300.
15. See Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care
Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1364-67 (1984).
16. See id. at 1364-72.
17. Am. Med. Assoc. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 536 (1943) ("[The AMA] represented
physicians who desired that they and all others should practice independently on a fee for service
basis, where whatever arrangement for payment each had was a matter that lay between him and
his patient in each individual case of service or treatment.").
18. See generally Mark A. Hall, InstitutionalControl of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriersto
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988).
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The unleashing of price-and, to a lesser extent, quality-competition over the past several decades has transformed the medical marketplace. The overwhelming majority of the population is in some
form of managed care, although the merits of that organizational arrangement remain in considerable dispute. Fee-for-service medicine
has not been replaced, but hybrid compensation arrangements have
become much more prevalent. Instead of simply trusting individual
physicians to "do the right thing," there has been a substantial increase in monitoring and public reporting of quality measures. Direct
financial incentives for higher-quality care (payment for performance
or "P4P") has become official government policy. Physicians now
practice in an environment that was inconceivable only two decades
ago.
The ethical rules of the medical profession have slowly evolved in
response to these developments. The patient-centered ethic, which
reached its zenith under unrestricted fee-for-service practice, remains
the centerpiece of professional self-definition, but it has been significantly tempered by considerations of the societal interests at stake.
Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses routinely appear in the
medical literature. Bedside rationing is seriously discussed, and physicians and physician groups have accepted contracts that tie their salaries to the cost and quality of the care they render.
To be sure, physicians have not simply acceded to these developments. They have formed unions; engaged in collusive anti-competitive conduct; created "astroturf" campaigns targeting specific
managed care practices; used disciplinary proceedings against medical
directors of managed care organizations; and done everything in their
power to create a managed care backlash. Although some of these
efforts were successful, there has still been a sea change in the organizational structure and incentive arrangements under which doctors
and other healthcare institutions operate.
At present, matters appear to have stabilized, but d6tente is not the
same thing as a lasting peace. Even modest financing or delivery-side
innovations can prompt controversy and a renewed debate over first
principles. The opening of a "Botox-on-the-go" storefront office in
Manhattan prompted a heated response from the usual suspects making the usual arguments. 19 More sweeping delivery-side initiatives,
19. Natasha Singer, The Little Botox Shop Around the Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at
G3:
Some doctors who specialize in administering such injections contended that convenience and pricing are inappropriate criteria for choosing a cosmetic medical provider. . . . [Tihe American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, the American
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such as the opening of outpatient nurse practitioner-staffed clinics in
retail outlets, have prompted heated denunciations and condemnation
from professional societies, including the AMA and the American
Academy of Pediatrics. 20 For anyone with a sense of history, the bill
of particulars is d6jA vu all over again:
Physicians, however, express concern about the quality of care and
the potential impact on their businesses....
The effect of this specialized care delivery model on traditional
primary care practices may be to remove some patients and services
from the doctor's office, leaving a sicker population behind. Some
practitioners will see this as "cream skimming" and a threat to their
revenue, particularly if they rely on income from short appointof more time-consuming
ments for simple cases to subsidize the 2cost
1
appointments for more complex cases.
Even modest attempts to disseminate truthful information on price
and quality can trigger opposition-and the mobilization of pliable
state agencies to do the dirty work.2 2 To summarize, the medical profession has used every tool at its disposal to resist the forces of competition. Although they have advanced these positions under the flag of
protecting patients, it is no accident that their positions neatly coincide with the protection of physicians' incomes, prerogatives, and control of the means of production. 23 Part III turns to the analogous
dynamics that have marked the legal profession's efforts to resist competitive forces.

Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, and the American Society for
Dermatologic Surgery will start a campaign Friday, called the Physicians Coalition for
Injectable Safety, to promote the idea that only board certified surgeons and dermatologists can guarantee cosmetic expertise.
Id.
20. See Bruce Japsen, Doctors, Retailers Square Off: AMA to Seek Probe of In-Store Clinics,
CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2007, sec. 3, at 1; Jay E. Berkelhamer, Retail Health Clinics Are a Return to
an Earlier Form of Medical Care, WALL ST. J., May 19-20, 2007, at A7 (noting the American
Academy of Pediatrics' opposition to retail clinics because they undermine continuity of care).
21. Richard Bohmer, The Rise of In-Store Clinics-Threator Opportunity?, 356 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 765, 765, 767 (2007).
22. See, e.g., Anthony Ramirez, Attorney General Objects to Insurer's Ranking of Doctors by
Cost and Quality, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at B3 (discussing New York State Attorney General's threat to insurance companies for adopting and preparing to publicize systems for ranking
physicians based on cost and quality of services they provide).
23. Such strategies are not unique to health care. Cf Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (striking down ethical prohibitions on competitive bidding that
were defended on the grounds that because "bidding on engineering services is inherently imprecise, [competition] would lead to deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safety and health").
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HAS THE LEGAL PROFESSION DEALT
WITH COMPETITION?

The legal profession has dealt with competition in much the same
way as the medical profession: vigorous resistance whenever possible
and grudging retreat or d6tente when absolutely necessary. As in the
medical context, the issue is invariably framed in terms of the importance of protecting consumers by ensuring that only high-quality legal
services are available. Consider the tenor of the Minority Report in
the American Bar Association's Report on Nonlawyer Activity in
Law-Related Situations:
[T]he report does not sufficiently emphasize that the protection of
the public should be an essential factor in any proposal to increase
access. We disavow any inference that may be taken to the effect
that access to justice is the paramount goal to be served, or that in
doubtful cases, the access goal should be given greater weight than
the goal of the protection of the public from the harm that may
befall them at the hands of unskilled or unethical providers. In our
judgment, the prospect of incompetent representation casts a long
shadow over the doorway of access .... To help assure maximum
access, nonlawyer provision of certain legal services should be encouraged and nurtured. But once the door of access is opened
wider, we must anticipate the dangers
to the public that could lurk
24
in the darkness behind that door.
As this excerpt suggests, lawyers routinely respond to competition by
emphasizing the risks to vulnerable consumers. However, as Professor Rhode observed, "the main danger lurking in the shadows is the
'2 5
bar's own interest in restricting competition.
Given this dynamic, it is not all that surprising that "much of the
specific content of former and current professional self-regulation falls
neatly within the economist's catalog of anticompetitive practices: entry restrictions that protect incumbents against new competition; market-division strategies that limit the competition of lawyers with one
another, and restraints on price and service. '' 26 As Professor Gellhorn
noted in an article bearing the understated title The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, "[o]nly the credulous can conclude that licensure is in
the main intended to protect the public rather than those who have
24. Ernest Y. Sevier & Raymond J. Werner, Minority Report, in COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER
PRACTICE,

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

NONLAWYER

AcTivITy IN LAw-RELATED

SITUA-

A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 163-65 (1995).
25. Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer

TIONS:

Practice,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 706 (1996).

26. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to OrdinaryAmericans, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 531, 551-52 (1994).
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been licensed or, perhaps in some instances, those who do the
licensing. "27
Those who doubt that this is a fair description of how the organized
bar has dealt with competition should consider the confrontations
over the use of staff counsel and fixed fee arrangements in insurance
defense,2 8 the unbundling of legal services, 2 9 partnerships between
lawyers and nonlawyers, 30 and the ongoing fight over whether lawyers
3 1 If
need to be involved in real estate closings and refinancings.
you're still prepared to believe that professional self-regulation is all
about protecting the public, I've got a bridge in Brooklyn that you'll
want to take a look at.
IV.

WHEN AND WHY LAWYERS QUA LAWYERS
ARE THE PROBLEM

As this brief tour of the regulation of the medical and legal professions suggests, the most recent complaints about "new pressures that
may jeopardize the quality of the advice delivered" are mostly about
the resistance of incumbent providers to the impact of market forces
and competition. But it does not follow that lawyers qua lawyers cannot be part of the problem.
Although there is obviously considerable individual variation, law
tends to attract people with-and legal training tends to accentuatecertain distinctive characteristics and personality traits. David Mais27. Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 25 (1976);
accord Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest
Regulation, 82 IowA L. REV. 965, 966 (1997) (noting that the organized bar can use rules of legal
ethics to "enhance its profits . . . by limiting the supply of legal services available in the
marketplace").
28. See Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing
Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 221-22, 243-44
(1997).
29. See Hyman, Professional Responsibility, supra note 2, at 395.
30. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1707, 1721 (1998). Professor Ribstein elaborated on the issue as follows:
If we had true multi-disciplinary firms, which were capable of delivering one-stop finance, accounting and legal advice and guidance, maybe this would change. But
outside legal advice now can come only from firms that are controlled by lawyers. Not
that firms would necessarily be better if they were controlled by any other single profession. But what if the firm could be controlled by capitalist owners interested only in
profits? Then we might see structures better designed to fit clients' needs.
Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://www.ideoblog.org/ (Apr. 5, 2007, 5:52 AM) (emphasis in original).
31. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Competition in the Real Estate Marketplace, Advocacy Letters,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/outreach/letters.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2008); George C. Leef,
'UPL' Lawyer Welfare Revisited, 25 REG. 8. 8-9 (2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regv25n4/v25n4-noted.pdf.
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ter, a consultant specializing in advising professional services firms,
holds up a mirror to the profession in his regular column in American
Lawyer:
[L]awyers are professional skeptics: They are selected, trained, and
hired to be pessimistic and to spot flaws. To protect their clients,
they place the worst possible construction on the outcome of any
idea or proposal, and on the motives, intentions, and likely behaviors of those they are dealing with....
In their legal training, lawyers are encouraged to be dispassionate. They have been schooled to leave their personal feelings at
home....
As many researchers have shown, lawyers score very low in the
areas of intimacy skills and sociability....
When lawyers reason with each other, the primary objectives are
not necessarily logic, consistency, reasonableness, or fairness. In
their professional practice, whether in trial or deal-making, many
lawyers are more frequently rewarded for persuasiveness, rhetoric,
verbal agility, and point scoring....
Lawyers also have a strange view of the concept of risk. In any
other business, an idea that was likely to work much of the time
would be eagerly explored. This is not necessarily the case with
lawyers. If one partner says, "This works in the vast majority of
cases," you can be sure that another will say, "Maybe, but I can
construct a hypothetical scenario where it will fail to work. That
makes it risky." Probabilities do not seem to influence the discussion, only possibilities. There is no greater condemnation in legal
discourse than to describe something as risky.
Contracts, deals, and
32
court cases must be bulletproof, not risky.

How do these traits play out in issues that arise at the interface of law
and medicine? I focus on two examples: disclosure/communication
after an adverse event and a tragic case involving end-of-life care.
A.

What Should Doctors Say to Their Patients after
Something Bad Happens?

Anyone who has ever seen a TV show involving lawyers knows
their standard advice on dealing with the police. Don't say anything,
no matter what. Don't explain. Don't justify. Don't rationalize.
Opening your mouth can only make things worse. Just ask any crimi33
nal defense lawyer and you'll get chapter and verse on the subject.
32. David Maister, The Trouble With Lawyers, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 2006, at 97, 99-100.
33. See Some Advice From Your Public Defender, http://www.craigslist.orglabout/best/sfo/
70300494.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2008) ("You have the right to remain silent. So SHUT THE
FUCK UP."); Nat'l Lawyers Guild: L.A. Chapter, Dealing With the Police: General Guidelines
for Activists, http://www.nlg-la.org/Dealing-with-Police.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2008); Baum &
Assocs., When the Police Come Knocking... http://www.baumlaw.com/info.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2008); Law Office of Kevin R. Churchill, Why You Shouldn't Talk to Police, http://www.
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The connection is so clear that it has passed into common parlance: to
"lawyer up" is slang for "to stop answering questions during a police
34
interrogation, and request a lawyer.
Not surprisingly, defense lawyers and in-house counsel have
brought the same strategies and mindset to bear in dealing with medical malpractice. When something bad happens, the standard legal advice is "never apologize and say as little as possible." In general,
healthcare providers have deferred to this advice.
This is clearly an example of lawyers acting like lawyers, but why is
that a problem? Ignore for the moment that the advice is inconsistent
with the ethical obligations of hospitals and physicians to disclose such
information to injured patients. Instead, focus on the reality that the
"don't say anything" strategy results in patient dissatisfaction and ap35
pears to actually increase the probability of a malpractice lawsuit.
The lawyerly strategy has also triggered a backlash: several states now
require hospitals to disclose serious, unanticipated outcomes to patients; grassroots organizations are promoting apology; some malpractice insurers and healthcare institutions are experimenting with
greater disclosure; and many states have passed laws encouraging
36
apologies.
To be sure, it is an open question whether healthcare providers
would behave differently if they did not receive advice from their lawyers. People do not like to acknowledge their mistakes. Providers
might also believe that being more forthcoming will increase the number of claimants and the direct costs they will bear as a result of their
malpractice. 3 7 Thus, it is possible that the "advice of counsel" defense
may have simply given physicians license to do something they would
have done anyway. It remains to be seen how the apology movement
colorado-criminal-lawyer.com/police/evidence.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2008). It's not just
American lawyers. See, e.g., Pub. Legal Educ. Ass'n of Saskatchewan, Talking to Police: Why
You Need a Lawyer (2005), http://www.plea.orglnewyj/resources/talkpolice.pdf. See also Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian
(But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 264 n.75 (2006) ("The Automobile Association of America gives every insured instructions about what to do 'if you have an accident':
'Do not admit responsibility for or discuss the circumstances of the accident with anyone other
than the police or an authorized Auto Club claims representative."' (emphasis in original)).
34. Urban Dictionary, Lawyer Up, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.phpterm=lawyer
+up (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
35. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the
U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV.

893, 944 (2005).
36. See Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net/newsletter20070308.phtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
37. See David M. Studdert et al., Disclosure Of Medical Injury To Patients: An Improbable
Risk Management Strategy, 26 HEALTH AFF.215, 215-20 (2007).
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will turn out, but the preferred solution of many lawyers to malpractice exemplifies how lawyers can become the problem, instead of the
solution.
B.

The Linares Case

My second example of the problems that can arise at the interface
of law and medicine is a train-wreck of a case, where the crash was
triggered by the actions of a single risk-averse lawyer. 38 On August 2,
1988, Samuel Linares, a young child, swallowed a balloon and stopped
breathing. He was hospitalized at Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's hospital in Chicago for eight months, during which the physicians concluded that he was in a persistent vegetative state and would never
recover. In response to multiple requests from Samuel's parents, the
doctors agreed that it was appropriate to remove the respirator that
was keeping Samuel alive. 39 However, the hospital's general counsel,
Max Brown, advised the physicians "not to remove the life support for
the Linares child. 'There is an absence in the law,' Mr. Brown said. 'I
told the medical staff there was a possibility they would face criminal
' 40
charges. I can't speculate with the careers of doctors and nurses." '
Brown advised Mr. Linares, a twenty-three-year-old laborer, that he
should seek a court order authorizing the removal of the respirator.
The hospital had taken the same steps in a similar, contemporaneous
case where the parents disagreed on whether treatment should be discontinued. Obtaining a court order in that case is reported to have
cost $40,000. Linares made about $300 per week. The medical bills
for his son were estimated to total $200,000.
The Linareses had scheduled an appointment with a lawyer on
April 28, 1989 to discuss the matter. However, two days before their
scheduled appointment, Mr. Linares walked into the intensive care
unit of the hospital, pulled out a handgun, announced that he didn't
want to hurt anyone, and ordered all medical personnel out of the
room. He disconnected his son's respirator and held his son in his
38. See Steven H. Miles, Taking Hostages: The Linares Case, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4, 4
(1989); Dirk Johnson, Questionsof Law Live On After Father Helps Son Die, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1989, at A26.

39. Johnson, supra note 38. "'There was no ethical difference of opinion here,' said Dr. Gilbert Goldman, the child's physician. 'The physicians agreed that the child was in an irreversible
coma and would not recover. There was no medical opposition to removing the ventilator."' Id.
The medical staff had also advised the Linares family "for months that Samuel's death was imminent." Id. Notwithstanding this unanimity of opinion, when Mr. Linares tried to disconnect his
son from the respirator on a previous occasion, "hospital workers wrestled him to the floor," and
"Mr. Linares was warned that he risked criminal charges if the boy died."

40. Id.

Id.
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arms while he died. He then surrendered to police. The attending
physician for Samuel stated that "[t]here was no question that these
were decent and concerned parents who cared very much for their

child. "41
Cecil Partee, who had been appointed Cook County State's Attorney a month earlier, said he would pursue "compassionate channels"
in the case, but filed first degree murder charges, because "no one has
the right to take the law into their own hands. '42 After the grand jury
refused to indict Linares, he pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of
unlawful use of a weapon, and the judge sentenced him to a one-year
conditional discharge.
Reeling from bad publicity over his unsuccessful attempt to indict
Linares, Partee announced that a commission would develop guidelines for handling similar cases. He was voted out of office in the next
election. Brown remains the general counsel of Rush, but judging by
the dearth of litigation involving treatment-termination at Rush, he
seems to have decided that the law is now sufficiently clear that treatment can be discontinued without resort to legal process.
To be sure, Brown was not representing the Linareses, and he owed
them no duty of care or competence. If there was a bona fide risk of
criminal liability, requiring judicial sign-off before disconnecting lifesupport was simply prudent-particularly given the previously mentioned dispute that unfolded over the treatment of a patient in the
Rush ICU where the parents disagreed about the correct course of
treatment. Yet there is simply no evidence that there was actually a
bona fide risk other than Brown's assertions. The parents and medical
professionals agreed that it was appropriate to cease treatment. The
attending physician had previously terminated treatment in numerous
earlier cases.4 3 The flood of commentary that followed these events
was harshly critical of Brown's position.4 4 There is no evidence that
Brown was acting in anything but the utmost good faith, but his risk
aversion on behalf of his client and his preference for resolution
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Norman Fost, Do the Right Thing: Samuel Linares and Defensive Law! 17 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 330 (1989); John D. Lantos et al., The Linares Affair, 17 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 308 (1989); Christine Mitchell, On Heroes and Villains in the Linares Drama, 17
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 339 (1989); Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E. Cranford, Legal Advice,
Moral Paralysis and the Death of Samuel Linares, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 316 (1989):
Nancy A. Wynstra, Role of In-House Counsel in Decisions about Withdrawal of Life Sustaining
Treatment, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 325 (1989). A response by Rush personnel may be
found at Gilbert M. Goldman et al., What Actually Happened: An Informed Review of the Linares Incident, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 298 (1989).
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through legal process exemplifies how lawyers qua lawyers can be the
problem.
C. Representativeness?
How representative are these two examples? Not very, as it happens-because, in both instances, the law and the lawyers eventually
accommodated themselves to external reality, rather than persisting in
trying to force the opposite. Far too often, lawyers push legal norms
on people who don't want them and have little use for them.45 Within
the field of healthcare, informed consent-that quintessential quasicontractual creation of lawyers qua lawyers-exemplifies the problem:
[I]nformed consent is at worst a failure and at best a frustrating disappointment. The court assumed that patients hunger to make their
own decisions and are thwarted by imperialistic doctors. But decades of evidence now establish that many patients feel no such
hunger and that as patients become older and sicker any such hunger dwindles away. Even doctors who try earnestly and arduously
are baffled when they attempt to equip patients to make intelligent
medical decisions. Patients misunderstand even the most basic facts
about treatments, do 46not remember what they are told, and do not
analyze it accurately.
To summarize, far too many legislators and lawyers believe that "the
keys to the courthouse" are "the keys to the kingdom" and that things
go better with due process. 47 The result is laws and legal norms that
"rest[ ] on demonstrably false assumptions about how human beings
think and act."' 48 After the near-inevitable failure of these laws and
legal norms to accomplish their intended objectives, "[wihat remains
is more regulations whose fatuity convinces their subjects that the law
is ignorant, witless, and malign, something doctors are already all too
' 49
willing to believe.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that lawyers can be part of the solution, but
they are sometimes the problem. How, then, should we differentiate
45. See Stewart Macauley, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55, 61 (1963) ("You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever
want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because
one must behave decently."); see also Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life's Golden
Tree: EmpiricalScholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 96.
46. Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 45, at 96.
47. David A. Hyman, How Law Killed Ethics, 34 PERSP. Bio. & MED. 134, 150 (1990). See
also David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices
of American Health Care, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (Autumn 2006).

48. Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 45, at 97.
49. Id.
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garden-variety professional turf-protection and resistance to market
forces-where doing nothing, other than enforcing the antitrust laws,
is likely to be the optimal regulatory response-from issues where
lawyers qua lawyers are the problem, where doing something more
might be appropriate? To be sure, the situation is complicated by the
usual difficulty of balancing Type I and Type II errors, coupled with
50
the tendency of bootleggers to align themselves with Baptists.
There is no perfect solution to these problems, but better incentives
for the delivery of the desired services-including the dismantling of
regulations that unnecessarily impede competition and market entry-are an excellent place to start improving the status quo. Those
who resist such steps are mostly concerned not with market failures,
but with market successes:
It is ironic that just as a global network and automation are reducing the costs of contracting, and moving us closer to the world in
which the Coase Theorem prevails, people promote more and more
contract-defeating schemes. One is tempted to think that they are
concerned not about market failures but about market successesabout the prospect that the sort of world people prefer when they
vote their own pocketbooks will depart from the proposers' ideas of
what people ought to prefer. Next thing you know, why, economic
between consenting adults will break out right in public
transactions
51
view!
Those who oppose more competitive markets for professional services
invariably claim that their efforts are based on high moral principle
and reflect the interests of consumers. They are wrong on both
scores. 5 2 Their efforts should be seen for what they are, instead of
what they pretend them to be.

50. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REG. 5, 5 (Fall 1999):
Durable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups. "Baptists" point to the moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable public benefits promised by a desired regulation. Baptists flourish
when their moral message forms a visible foundation for political action. "Bootleggers" are much less visible but no less vital. Bootleggers, who expect to profit from the
very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery with
some of their expected proceeds. They are simply in it for the money.
Id.
51. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus PropertyLaw?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 111
(1999) (emphasis in original).
52. See Richard A. Posner, Bad News, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, sec. 7, at 1 ("[W]hen competition is intense, providers of a service are forced to give the consumer what he or she wants, not
what they, as proud professionals, think the consumer should want, or more bluntly, what they
want." (emphasis in original)) (book review).

